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COUNSEL FEES IN STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE AND
CLASS ACTIONS-HORNSTEIN REVISITED
Douglas G. Cole*
N 1939, the first in a series of four comprehensive law review articles
by Professor George D. Hornstein was published on the subject of
the award of counsel fees in stockholders' derivative suits and corporate
class actions.1 These articles highlighted equitable principles peculiar
to such actions, previously not fully understood by either attorneys or
the courts, which have made derivative and class actions extremely
effective weapons in the battle for corporate democracy. Three very
basic questions were posed and answered: 1) Who will pay for the
attorneys fees and expenses incurred in such litigation? 2) What factors govern the award of counsel fees? 3) How are they calculated?
Using the legal principles collected in Hornstein's articles, the United
States Supreme Court in 1970 in Mills v. ElectricAuto-Lite Co.2 allowed
an interim award of litigation expenses and reasonable attorneys fees
incurred in proving a violation by corporate officers of the securities
laws. Because the Mills decision has had a profound impact on corporate
derivative and class actions, it is important to now re-examine the basic
legal theories which are involved, as well as to touch upon those areas
of the law in which difficult problems remain unanswered.
I. WHO WILL PAY THE AwARD

Although as a general rule the successful party in litigation is not
reimbursed for his counsel fees and expenses, 3 the courts have recognized
that departure from this principle is desirable and probably necessary
in derivative and class actions. Because of the large sums generally in*Member of the Ohio Bar. A.B., Oberlin College, 1942; I.A., Harvard Business School,
1943; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1948.
1 Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
HARv. L. Rnv. 658 (1956); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits,
47 CoLuM. L. REv. 1 (1947); Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 CoLuM. L. REv. 574 (1942); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's
Derivative Suits, 39 CoLUM. L. REv. 784 (1939).
2 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
3 Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum. L. REv.
784, 786 (1939).
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volved and the unequal resources available as between the individual
plaintiff and the corporation for conducting such litigation, derivative
and class actions would be effectively deterred without a satisfactory
answer to the question of who will bear the burden of the legal fees
and expenses. American courts have developed a series of equitable doctrines which answer this inquiry in a manner that has fostered and
encouraged such suits.
The first of these principles was early announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Trustees v. Greenough.4 A bondholder successfully
brought suit to have fraudulent conveyances on the part of trustees set
aside, and then sought reimbursement for counsel fees and expenses. The
Court allowed counsel fees, applying reasoning that when a litigant
salvages assets in which others will share, i.e., creates increases, or protects a fund for the benefit of a class of which he is a member, the resultant fund may be charged with all necessary expenses incurred in
achieving that result. The expenses of the successful litigant are paid,
not by the unsuccessful litigant, but by the class which would have had
to pay them had it brought suit itself.
Two theories lay behind this rule, 1) the theory of representation or
agency by the one member of the class on behalf of all in securing
counsel, and 2) the quasi-contractual theory that 'each member of a class
receiving benefit from the litigation brought by counsel should contribute his due proportion of the legal expenses so incurred.6
Of equal importance was the rule announced in Sprague v. Ticonic
National Bank 7 in which the Supreme Court held that nothing in the
U.S. 527 (1881).
5 See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REv.
784, 786-88 (1939).
4 105

6 Id. at 789. Contribution from the entire fund has been required even as to those

shareholders, generally members of management, who opposed plaintiffs litigation
since, in benefiting from the litigation as a member of the broad class of shareholders,

they now had a legal interest in that which they formerly held illegally. See German
Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v. Archambault, 404 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1966);
Leggett v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.AV.2d 833 (Mo. 1961); Heckelman v.
Geyer, 252 Pa. 123, 97 A. 193 (1916).

A corollary to this rule is that the loss of an unwarranted advantage gained by
one through illegal means cannot be used to demonstrate a detriment. As stated in
Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel, Inc., 360 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1962):

...A claim of loss cannot be based upon a failure to make a profit out of the
wrongful and unauthorized act which would not have been permitted to stand in
any event. Id. at 659.
7 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
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Trustee v. Greenough doctrine indicated that the action must actually
bring money into the court as a pre-requisite to an order for reimbursement of expenses. Rather the foundation of the court's power to reimburse such expenses lies in the original authority of the chancellor
to do equity in a particular situation.
The third principle, which evolved from the Sprague rule, is that
where the litigation has conferred a substantial benefit on the members
of an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to
spread the cost proportionately among them, reimbursement of legal
fees will be awarded, regardless of whether an actual money recovery
has been obtained in the corporation's favor. Examples would include
situations where the wrongful issuance of shares for an inadequate consideration has been set aside, the cancellation of an illegal and onerous
contract has been accomplished, or the termination of a voting trust
has been achieved.8 The theory behind an award in such successful
cases is that the litigation, although not bringing a fund into court, has
benefited the holders of all shares by enhancing the value thereof.'
The fourth principle is that first formulated in Schechtman v. Wolfson,10 but more 'effectively stated in Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light
& Power Association,1 to the effect that a corporation may receive a
substantial benefit from a derivative suit and therefore be liable for
counsel fees incurred, 'even though the benefit cannot be calculated in
monetary terms. "
Even when it is difficult or impossible to assign a monetary value to
the particular substantial benefit in the case of derivative and class actions based upon violations of the SEC statutes and rules, the courts feel
that such actions vindicate the statutory policy, involve corporate ther8 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co, 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 & nn.18-20 (1970).

9See Allen v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 180 Misc. 259, 40 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Cr. 1943).
10 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957).
"1257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
12 The test of whether there has been a "substantial benefit'

in a particular case
may be stated generally as:
[A] substantial benefit must be something more than technical in its consequence and be one that accomplishes a result which corrects or prevents an abuse
which would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation or affect
the enjoyment or protection of an essential right to the stockholder's interest. Id.
at 367, 101 N.W.2d at 427.
The Bosch decision is discussed in more detail at p. 271 infra.
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apeutics, and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important means of enforcement of such statutes.' 3
14
The major contribution made by Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.
in this area is in its pronouncement that such non-monetary benefits
involving corporate therapeutics can furnish the basis for an interim
award of litigation expenses and attorneys fees, even before the merits
of the controversy have been adjudicated.
One student note has suggested that the Mills decision may so encourage derivative litigation that such actions will prove a prohibitively expensive liability to the corporation.'
This fear has been expressed
throughout decades of derivative litigation, and should be no more valid
in the future than it has been over the past thirty years, as such award is
made only if the cause of action is validly established, and, thus, a benefit,
monetary or otherwise, has been secured for the corporation and its
stockholders. The benefits accorded to the corporation and their stockholders should continue in the future to outweigh greatly the corporate
expense involved.
It should also be pointed out that the advent of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,", with its proscription against dismissal
or compromise of class or derivative actions without the approval of the
court has been a most effective bar to frivolous or strike suits. This rule
has meant that counsel for the plaintiff has to shoulder the burden and
expense of adequately preparing his case for trial under the watchful
eye of the court, and that he cannot depend upon an early settlement
based principally upon the recovery of attorneys' fees. Plaintiff's counsel
must face the fact that before he is compensated for his time or expenses, a substantial benefit to the corporation or its shareholders or to
the members of the class must be demonstrated. In dollars and cents,
Is Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
14 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
15 Note, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company: Proxy Violations-The Causation
Question and the Award of Attorney's Fees, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 873-76 (1970).
16
FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(e) provides:
Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs.
The last sentence of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 pertaining to derivative actions by shareholders
provides:
The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
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this has meant, by way of example, in three recent derivative actions
within the knowledge of the author, from $30,000 to $40,000 in expenses
incurred for expert witnesses in the fields of security analysis, accountancy and corporate operation, depositions, travel expenses and duplicating costs during discovery, with no hope of recoupment if the cases
were not successfully concluded." With this much dependent on the
outcome, plaintiff's counsel must be very sure of his legal position before
he brings the action.
The Mills case should narrow the gap which previously existed between class actions and derivative suits, as to the measure of the benefit
needed to be shown in order to secure an award of attorneys' fees. In
the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Slayton,'8 the plaintiffs
brought a class action which secured a favorable decision as to the voting procedures between Class A and Class B stock, but the court of
appeals denied the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees on the ground that the corporation did not derive the requisite benefit from the maintenance of the
class action. Each plaintiff was therefore relegated to collection of his
expenses from the individual shareholder members of his class, a formidable task.
Under the cases which preceded Mills, the courts required plaintiffs
in a class action to establish a definite, measurable, pecuniary benefit to
the class, whereas in a derivative suit all the plaintiff needed to show was
a substantial benefit (even though not measurable pecuniarily) to the
corporation or all of the shareholders in order to recover his attorneys'
fees.' 9 While Mills was primarily a derivative suit, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, in Kahan v. Rosenstiel,20 in a pure class action, has
correctly extended the Mills holding that attorneys' fees may be awarded
in any case where the cause of action has "conferred a substantial benefit" as opposed to a measurable pecuniary benefit. The teaching of the
Mills and Kahan decisions should prevent a repetition of the unfavorable
result achieved in the Slayton case.

II.

THE FACTORS GOVERNING THE AwARD

The general rules applicable to an award of counsel fees in actions
17 Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Civil No. 7704, 7707, 7720 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Martin
v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., Civil No. 7245 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Cole v. Union Bankers
Ins. Co., Civil No. 9286 (N.D. Texas 1970).
18 407 F.2d 1078 (8th cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 937 (1969).
19 See 14 ST. Louis L.J. 324, 327, 332 (1969).

20 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 US. 950 (1970).
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where a monetary fund has been created or preserved have become
well-settled, as discussed in Professor Hornstein's articles, and generally
are not seriously questioned in particular actions. 2' Three areas of bitter
conflict remain, however, which seemingly can only be resolved on a
case by case basis, at least until the emergence of more precise rules
from far more cases than have been presently decided.
These troublesome areas include:
1) The kind and degree of proof necessary to establish the causal
connection between the litigation and a subsequent settlement, unilateral
recission, or other form of corrective measure by the defendants during
litigation, and before final judgment, which moots the cause.
2) The calculation of the benefit in cases involving either settlement
or unilateral steps taken by the defendants during litigation mooting the
action, particularly in those situations where the benefit is not capable
of expression in monetary terms, and
3) The amount of the award in those cases in which it is impossible,
or extremely difficult, to calculate the monetary value of the benefit,
as well as those cases in which the calculated benefit is in excess of
$4,000,000.
A. Causal Connection
A most difficult situation for a plaintiff in either a derivative or a
class action occurs when at some stage of the litigation before final
judgment, the defendants take action without the knowledge or approval of the plaintiff or the court which effectively moots the issues
raised in the litigation.
In such cases, the courts have awarded counsel fees to the attorney
for the plaintiff shareholder, upon a finding that plaintiff's suit was
meritorious, and that such meritorious action caused or substantially
contributed to the action taken by the defendants to abandon, rescind
suits
or otherwise moot the action.22 The established rule is that such
23
are meritorious if they could have survived a motion to dismiss.
The court will consider that even though a motion to dismiss has been
granted because the issues have been rendered moot, it retains jurisdicSee Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970).
23 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970); Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 43 Del.

21
22

Ch. 252, 223 A.2d 384 (1966); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 279, 209
A.2d 459 (1959).
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tion to consider whether plaintiff's action was meritorious, and whether
his action caused or contributed to cause others to benefit.24 The trial
court generally has little difficulty in determining whether the plaintiff's underlying action was meritorious or not, based upon the inquiry
as to whether it could have withstood a motion to dismiss. However, the
courts have had more difficulty in enunciating a standard by which to
judge whether it was plaintiff's meritorious action which caused the
defendants to set aside their challenged acts, as opposed to the predictable statements of the defendants that they took such steps for business
reasons having nothing to do with the litigation.
To date, the courts faced with this decision have not gone into an
extended discussion of causation but have contented themselves with a
simple finding that if the action was meritorious, it could be inferred
that such litigation did cause defendants' unilateral acts which mooted
the cause. The following language from the cases is typical:
The Court concludes that defendants' cancellation after plaintiff had
prosecuted its action to the brink of success provides a sufficient basis
for an 2inference that the cancellation was in fact due to plaintiff's
efforts. 5
or:

We leave to the determination of the court below whether or not
Levine's suit was relevant to Wills' prepayment of his note, i.e.,
whether there was a causal connection
between the two incidents: in
26
short, whether Levine's claim is valid.

or, the terse:
27
Actions speak louder than words.

In Rosethal v. Burry Biscuit Corp.,28 the court placed the burden
of proof as to causation on the defendants, stating:
Where, as here, the matter has been rendered moot by the action of
the defendants, I think it reasonable to impose on the defendants the
24Levine v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1967); Gilson v. Chock Full 0' Nuts
Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964); Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1957); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Fletcher v. AJ. Indus.,
226 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968).
25 Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26
Levin v. Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620, 625 (3d Cit. 1967).
27 Marlin v. Marsh & Marsh, 189 Ark. 1157, 1158, 76 S.W.2d 965, 966 (1934).
2843 Del. Ch. 279, 209 A.2d 459 (1949).
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burden of showing that the cancellation was not in any way occasioned by the existence of the lawsuit. I hasten to emphasize that even
if such a burden is sustained, the plaintiff's attorney would still be
29
entitled to a fee if it is shown that the cause of action was meritorious.
A similar position was taken in Maggiore v. Bradford. While the suit
was pending, the stock transaction complained of, which permitted the
Comer group to finance the purchase of their controlling shares from
the corporation's assets, was voluntarily rescinded by the defendants,
mooting the action. Upon application for legal fees, the district court
held that it did not have the right to award fees in that situation. In
reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held:
The District Court did not consider the right to an allowance of
attorneys' fees on the basis of the liability of defendants to rescind
the transaction and the case must be remanded for that purpose. The
fact that the defendants rescinded the transaction before the court had
an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the case would not, in our
judgment, defeat the right to compensation. 3 '
In Vigi'an v. Hamilton,32 the corporation had accepted an offer of
$90,000 for its buildings. A shareholder brought suit alleging the price
was too low, whereupon the successful bidder then increased his price
to $126,000. The sale was closed and the litigation was thereby mooted.
The court found a causal connection between the suit and the result,
and awarded a $3,000 fee based upon the benefit of the increase in price
of $36,000.
The shareholders' attorney in Gilson v. Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp.,made a demand on the corporation to recover insiders' short-swing
profits. After some delay, the corporation filed suit and successfully
id. at 281, 209 A.2d at 461.
30 310 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1962).
SlId. at 522. In a subsequent appeal on the issue of the amount of the attorney's fees,
where the award was $235,000 based upon the restoration of $2,700,000 in assets to the
corporation, the sixth circuit stated:
It cannot be said that the cancellation of the purchase of the Moore stock did
not result from the action of the minority stockholders. Its cancellation inured
to the benefit of the corporation by restoring $2,700,000 in assets in lieu of the
29

Moore stock. We are unable to say that the amount allowed is excessive.
Denney v. Phillips & Buttorff Corp., 331 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir. 1964).
32 321111. App. 541, 53 N.E.2d 250 (1944).
33 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
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collected the illegal profits. Upon suit for attorneys' fees based upon the
efforts in calling such suit to the corporation's attention, the court stated:
It -would run counter to effective enforcement of the statute [§ 16(b)
Act of 1934] wholly to deny compensaof the Securities Exchange
34
tion in such a case.
In Mencher v. Sachs, 5 the president of the defendant corporation
issued a large block of stock to Milestone Drilling Company on the eve
of a stockholders meeting. Milestone then voted its stock for management. Suit was brought to set aside the transfer of stock and the vote
of such shares. Milestone thereupon surrendered the stock and the contract was cancelled, mooting the cause of action.
On the issue of causation, the court simply stated:
We agree with the Chancellor that this case was an appropriate one
in which to allow counsel fees....
... Cancellation of illegally issued stock is in itself a benefit. Although
the benefit may be difficult of evaluation in dollars and cents, it is
still a benefit.30
Those few cases denying an award of counsel fees in such a situation
do not discount the general observations made above. 37 The factual situation in each clearly indicates that the benefits or partial benefits
achieved by the unilateral actions of the defendants could not be attributed to the plaintiff's actions.
B. Calculation of the Benefit
In both derivative and class actions, whether tried, settled or unilaterally mooted by some action taken by the defendants, the form of
34

Id. at 110.

35 39 Del. Ch. 366, 164 A.2d 320 (1960).
36 Id. at 367-68, 164 A.2d at 322-23.

37
1n Wolfes v. Paragon Refining Co., 74 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1934) the board of
directors recovered a debt owed to the corporation by its president and cancelled back
salary payment to him on the day the derivative suit was filed, but before the board
was aware of the filing. In Derdiarian v. Futterrnan Corp., 254 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), the court excluded the benefits achieved by a return of Class B stock, noting
that the recovery thereof was not for the benefit of the plaintiff class and was not
brought about by the plaintiff, but by separate negotiations conducted by the corpora-

ion's own counsel.
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the relief accorded to the corporation and its shareholders grows in
complexity with each passing year, posing extremely difficult tasks for
plaintiff's attorneys in demonstrating the monetary value of such benefits, and for the court in fixing fees based thereon.

Calculationof Fees T4hen Benefit Is Pecuniary
In settlements in which the corporation or its shareholders receive
cash, the computation of the benefit presents very little difficulty to the
court. Thus, in Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp. 8 a recovery of
$5,300,000 was paid into court, to be distributed after payment of legal
fees and expenses to those shareholders who had purchased and/or
sold Transitron stock after the SEC registration attacked by the suit.
In those cases in which definite and ascertainable liabilities are cancelled by the settlement, the courts also are able to translate these into
monetary benefits, although with somewhat less ease. In Krinsky v.
Helfand, 9 a lease, an employment contract and a stock option agreement were cancelled, and another lease renewed. The Delaware high
court valued the total benefit to the corporation at $500,000.
The difficulty in calculating the value of the benefit conferred mounts
geometrically as the relief accorded utilizes novel methods of ending
the litigation; methods tailored to e.ase the burden of payment by the
responsible defendants, resulting in benefits which are difficult to value
in dollars and cents. It is interesting to consider briefly at this point a
few decisions which illustrate the various methods employed by the
courts in evaluating the monetary benefit conferred by such settlements.
In Pergament v. Kaiser-FrazerCorp.,40 the settlement, in addition to
38 221 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1963), aff'd sub nor. Green v. Transitron Electronic
Corp., 326 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1964). See, e.g., Newman v. Electronic Specialty Co,
71 CCH Sac. L. RFP. $192955 (N.D. Ill. 1971) ($1,200,000 was recovered); Newman v.
RKO General, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ($8,000,000 in short-swing
profits was recovered); Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. La. 1970) (fee determination based upon $1,000,000 recovery paid into court may be found in 71 CCH SEc. L.
REP. T192938 (E.D. La. 1970); Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967) ($775,000 was paid into court for distribution to
those shareholders who had purchased stock after the SEC registration attacked by the
suit); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ($1,825,000 was
similarly deposited); Perlman v. Feldmann, 160 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1958) ($1,150,000
was paid into court); National Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Rosson, 400 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) ($1,025,000 was recovered by the corporation).
89 38 Del. Ch. 553, 156 A.2d 90 (1959).
40 224 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1955).
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a cash payment to the corporation of $500,000, included the personal
guaranty by Kaiser of a ten-year $34,000,000 loan from R.F.C. to the
corporation, secured by his collateral deposit of $10,000,000, and the
purchase of equipment from the corporation at $319,000,000 below its
true value. The court credited these benefits together, without assigning a dollar value, as being worth an additional $25,000 in attorneys'
fees. In Glicken v. Bradford,4 1 the settlement effected a $700,000 per
year reduction in fund management fees, 'estimated to be of value for
ten years, for a total estimated benefit of $7,000,000.
The judgment in The Herald Co. v. Bonfils42 required that stock
having an estimated value of $6,429,299 be sold at auction. In another
case the settlement required the corporation to issue up to two million
options to the class of shareholders, each option also having a put. The
court valued this package at $1,200,000, based upon evidence of the
43
market value of each item.
In Ripley v. International Railways,44 the judgment resulted in the
corporate receipt of $8,000,000 cash, together with future rate increases
with an estimated value of $7,500,000. The court awarded legal fees
based upon 20 per cent of the cash received, and an additional $104,900
for what was described as "some reasonable compensation for the prospective benefits," 45 for a total fee of $2,104,900.
In Christie v. Fifth Madison Corp.,4 6 18,456 Class A shares were
awarded to the corporation as treasury shares. The court fixed the benefit as the amount the corporation could receive if the shares were reissued. In Zenn v. Anzalone4 7 in addition to a cash payment of $3,300,000 the settlement effected an exchange of 130,000 non-voting for
130,000 voting shares of IDS (Investors Diversified Services, Inc.), vesting control of IDS in Alleghany Corporation. The court recognized
that control had a speculative future benefit which, while more valuable
to management than to the corporation, would be compensated for on
a lower percentage ratio than that applied to the cash benefits.
41 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
42 315 F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1970).
43

Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 254 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).

44 16 App. Div. 2d 260, 227 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1962).
45

Id. at 264, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 69.

46

35 Misc. 2d 570, 231 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

47 46 Misc. 2d 378, 259 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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Calculationof Fees When Benefit Is Non-Pecuniary
Those cases in which the court has found itself absolutely unable to
place a dollar value on relief which nevertheless does benefit the corporation or its shareholders pose a very real problem to plaintiff's counsel seeking an award of legal fees, because the courts have been unable
to formulate any consistent philosophy in arriving at the awards granted.
All courts agree, in the abstract, that in awarding fees to counsel in
derivative and class action cases, they are to be governed by the standard
of reasonableness with reference to the particular facts of each case.
Nor is there any dispute that the following factors are to be weighed
and considered:
... IT]he amount recovered for the corporation; the time fairly required to be spent on the case; the skill required and employed on the
case with reference to the intricacy, novelty and complexity of issues;
the difficulty encountered in unearthing the facts and the skill and resourcefulness of opposing counsel; the prevailing rate of compensation
for those with the skill, experience and standing of the attorneys, accountants or others involved; the contingent nature of the fees, with
the accompanying risk of wasting hours of work, overhead and expenses (for it is clearly established that compensation is awarded only
in the event of success); and the benefit accruing to the public from
48
suits such as this.
The cases are also uniform in holding that the results achieved rather
than the time spent is the prime factor in fixing the fee.49
Because of the frequency with which Professor Hornstein's articles"
have been cited to the courts since 1939, most trial courts, after reciting
the various factors to be taken into consideration, have become accustomed to applying a percentage ratio of the benefit accorded to determine the fee. However, no discernable pattern has emerged from those
awards made in cases where there is no dollar benefit on which to base
such a percentage, and the court necessarily is left to the application of
the remaining factors such as time, skill, difficulty, contingency, the
amount involved and the benefit to the public. An examination of the
48 Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959).
49

Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REv.
784, 811 (1939).
50

See note 1 supra.
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cases where a benefit has been found which is incapable of calculation
in monetary terms will indicate the problems confronting such courts.

In Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Association,1 the
judgment set aside an election of directors and an amendment to the
by-laws, both adopted illegally to gain control of a cooperative corporation. This decision by the Supreme Court of Minnesota is a landmark
in its enunciation of what substantial non-monetary benefit will justify

an award of attorneys' fees, the court stating:
... [A] substantial benefit must be something more than technical in its
consequence and be one that accomplishes a result which corrects or
prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation or affect the enjoyment or protection of an
essential right to the stockholder's interest.52

For having accomplished this substantial benefit in the case, the plaintiff's counsel received a fee of $4,467.40.11
In Berger v. Amana Society' 4 an amendment to the corporate charter
was enjoined which would have permitted the sale of control by the
issuance of Class B Stock. The trial court awarded fees of $59,341 based
solely on the time and skill of the attorneys. The Supreme Court of
Iowa, citing the Bosch decision, raised the award to $125,000, stating
that some of the benefits were pecuniary in nature even though no fund
was created and computation of their actual value in money might be
difficult.
In Dann v. Chrysler Corp.,' 5 the principal benefit was a modification
of the executive incentive compensation plan, a long-range benefit
characterized as therapeutic, incapable of expression in dollar terms, yet
present and real. The referee stated that he was adopting a quantum
meruit approach to translate the benefit and the fees into dollars.?6
Without spelling out what factors were included in such a quantum
meruit approach, the referee awarded a total of $450,000 in fees. This
award was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, that court
51257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
52 Id. at 365, 101 N.W.2d at 427.
53

Figure disclosed by report of defense counsel.

54 253 Iowa 378, 111 N.W.2d 753 (1962). The fee was awarded in Berger v. Amana

Society, 257 Iowa 956, 135 N.W.2d 618 (1965).
5543 Del. Ch. 252, 223 A2d 384 (1966), aff'g 42 Del. Ch. 508, 215 A.2d 709 (1965).
56 215 A.2d at 718. As "quantum meruit" literally means "as much as he deserved,"
the referee did not create a new standard by the use of this phrase.
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holding that a valuation of such benefits "can be accomplished only by
the exercise of sound business judgment." 57

In Fletcher v. A. 1. Industries, Inc.,8 the settlement provided for
future arbitration of the potential monetary recovery by the corporation, together with an immediate change in corporate management. Citing Bosch,"0 the court found these results to be of substantial benefit,
and affirmed the award of $64,784 in fees, in advance of the arbitration.
In so doing, this California court anticipated the result in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,c0 as to an award of fees on an interim level.
The courts have experienced particular trouble in valuing the benefit
in those cases which have been mooted by the unilateral acts of the
defendants at some point during the litigation. Aside from the problems
of causation discussed earlier, 61 the methods adopted by such defendants
to immunize their conduct frequently defy easy dollar calculation.
In Mencher v. Sachs,6 2 a derivative action was instituted to cancel the
issuance of stock. During the litigation the purchaser voluntarily surrendered the disputed shares. The Delaware Supreme Court commented
that the cancellation of illegally issued stock is in itself a benefit, although
difficult of evaluation in dollars and cents, and awarded a $30,000 fee.
0 3 the derivative action attacked
In Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp.,
stock options previously granted. The defendants unilaterally cancelled
the options, thereby mooting the action. The court announced the correct rule to be applied to such cases:
... [I]n a case of this type the attorney for a successful plaintiff would
in the normal course of events become entitled to a fee ....
[I]t is
a necessary corollary to this conclusion that such a plaintiff may not
be deprived of a fee by action taken by a defendant which has the
effect of curing the alleged wrong and rendering the controversy moot,
unless it be demonstrated that the curing of the defect is in nowise
related to the lawsuit and the lawsuit would not have succeeded in
any event. 4
57 223 A.2d at 389.
58 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968).
59 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
60 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See p.
supra.

61 See pp. 264-67 supra.
6239 Del. Ch. 366, 164 A.2d 320 (1960).
6342 Del. Ch. 279, 209 A.2d 459 (1949).
64d. at 280, 209 A.2d at 460.
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Counsel reports that the ultimate fee awarded to plaintiff's counsel was
$5,000.
Similarly, in Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 5 the derivative action attacked
a misleading proxy used to obtain a favorable vote on a stock option
granted to the corporation president, who, after a motion to dismiss
was overruled, cancelled the stock option agreement, alleging that he
did so for reasons other than the pendency of the suit. The court held
that it was permissible to infer that this cancellation was in fact due to
plaintiff's 'efforts. Counsel report that upon the fee hearing, an award
of $5,000 was granted."0
The simplistic approach to this dilemma is represented by the decision in Maggiore v. Bradford. 7 Corporate assets totaling $2,700,000
were expended illegally to allow management to gain control. After the
suit was filed, the purchase was rescinded. In evaluating the benefit to
the corporation, the court said that it was a $2,700,000 lawsuit, and
based the award of fees on the amount involved.
C. Amount of Awards
Professor Hornstein noted with respect to the amount of awards that
as of 1939, his examination of fifty-four cases indicated percentages
ranging between 20 per cent and 33 /3 per cent with the resultant average being slightly over 20 per cent.68 Since his last article on this subject
in 1956, '9 in which he repeated this observation, an examination has
been undertaken of twenty-four later reported cases of awards of counsel fees in either derivative or class action cases, under factual situations
which permitted the court to determine a monetary value for the benefit conferred. An Appendix to this article is provided to reflect the
results of this examination. Both reported and unreported awards are
included because, as was the case at the time of Professor Hornstein's
65

279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

66 But see Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957). The derivative action

sought an injunction against interlocking directors, who then resigned from the one
corporation. Upon examination of the facts, the court of appeals concluded that the
suit conferred no substantial benefit on the corporation, and denied all fees.
67 310 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1962).
6

SHomstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REv.
784, 813 & n.187 (1939).
69 Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
HAmv. L. REV. 658, 665 (1956).
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original article, many of the most important awards are not found in
the reports.
Most of these decisions demonstrate the prescient nature of Hornstein's observations when he wrote that in time there would be a large
enough number of such cases that standards would be set up and judicial
discretion correspondingly limited.7 ° What has happened is that most
courts have relied upon Professor Hornstein's prior research, as reported in his articles, and have adopted his 20 per cent average as the
standard without more. Indeed, in Pergament v. Kaiser-FrazerCorp.,7 '
the court made the flat statement that "no contention is made that 20%
of the amount of recovery does not reasonably measure the value of
services rendered." 72
In those cases where the court has been concerned principally with
the results achieved by counsel, the sheer size of the benefit has not
militated against an award based upon a percentage, even in those cases
where the fees have exceeded $1,000,000.
In other cases, however, the courts have applied a descending scale
of percentages as the benefits recovered by the action have exceeded
76
certain amounts.7 4 In a recent case, Newark v. RKO General, InC.,
the Securities and Exchange Commission in an amicus curiae brief
argued that there comes a point where the judgment is so large that a
fee based primarily on a percentage of recovery exceeds the limits of
reasonable compensation. The Commission specifically urged that in
the recovery of $7,900,000, a fee allowance limited to $1,000,000 was
701d. at 681-82.
71224 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1955).
72 Id. at 83. For other decisions adopting the straight 20 per cent formula, see, e.g.,
Newman v. Electronic Specialty Co., CCH FED. SEC. REP. 1 92955 (N.D. IMI.1971);
Mardel Securities, Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 278 F. Supp. 1010 (ED. Va.
1967); Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del. Ch. 553, 156 A.2d 90 (1959); Zenn v. Anzalone,
46 Misc. 2d 378, 259 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1965); National Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Rosson, 400 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).

72 See, e.g., Zenn v. Anza!one, 46 Misc. 2d 378, 259 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1965)

(award of $1,876,000 made for litigation extending for some ten years in state and
federal courts); Ripley v. International Ry., 16 App. Div. 2d 260, 227 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1962) ($1,500,000 in attorneys fees awarded plus $92,000 as disbursements in successful derivative action resulting in $8,000,000 recovery).
74
See, e.g., Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1958), aff'd in part
sub nonm. Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959); Winkelman v. General
Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Mann v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.
App. 2d 272, 127 P.2d 970 (1942).
75 332 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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appropriate and sufficient to provide the stimulus for enforcement of
the short-swing provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The court found that plaintiff's counsel had expended
some 4,000 hours in presenting the action, and awarded $750,000 in
fees, including disbursements.76
This concern is similar to that raised by Judge Wyzanski in Cherner
v. Transitron Electronic Corp.,7 where he noted that while there are
courts which have allowed a high percentage of even a large fund as
allowances to those whose efforts produced the fund, still, in a case
involving $5,300,000 in benefits, "unless the time spent and the skill
displayed be used as a constant check on applications for fees there is
a grave danger that the bar and bench will be brought into disrepute, ... " 78
So long as such awards are based primarily upon the results achieved,
with no reimbursement available upon loss, then this contingent factor
should, it is submitted, result in awards substantially higher than those
based solely upon the time and labor involved. The courts should be
able to reward counsel adequately and satisfy their own concepts of
reasonableness by applying an essentially standardized graduated scale of
percentages, without the necessity of imposing any arbitrary upper
limit on the award.
IIl.

PRO-RATA PAYMENT OF THE AWARD-

THE

THIRD-PARTY

PURCHASER DILEMMA

As stated earlier, it has been a basic premise in derivative actions that
while the suit is both derivative, i.e., brought in the name of the corporation, and representative, i.e., brought on behalf of all the stockholders, any recovery should be paid to the corporation which in turn
should bear the cost of any fees awarded. Since the recovery, where
monetary in nature, belongs to the corporation, no shareholder has the
right to demand the immediate withdrawal of his proportionate share
of the capital and claims of the corporate creditors could come before
those of the shareholders. It has been generally agreed that a contrary
rule would result in a multiplicity of suits.
A most unusual situation constituting an exception to this rule arises
76Id. at 164.
77 221 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1963).

78 Id. at 61.
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where, after the filing of a derivative suit alleging a breach of fiduciary
duties on the part of the officers or directors, a sale of all or substantially all of the stock in the corporation is made to a third person at a
price substantially above the prior-to-suit market price.
The 'earliest example of this factual situation may be found in two
early Pennsylvania decisions. In these cases, three corporate officers
sold treasury shares to themselves at $50 per share, and immediately
resold them to a third person for $64 per share. While the plaintiff's
derivative action to recover this illegal profit was pending, the thirdperson buyer, Callery, purchased other shares from various shareholders,
to the point of gaining control of the corporation.
After finding that the -entire proceeds of the sale of the treasury stock,
i.e., $64 per share, belonged to the corporation, the court determined
that Callery, the purchaser, paying $64 per share for the treasury stock,
did not intend that $14 of this price should b-e paid into the treasury
and be deemed an asset of the corporation. Accordingly, the stockholders of record on the date Callery bought the treasury shares were
entitled to the full benefit of the profit realized by the sale at $64 per
share, and payment should be made directly to each shareholder according to his respective stock holdings at that time. 0 In the same
fashion, the court ordered that plaintiff's attorneys fees and expenses
should b'e paid out of the entire fund recovered, pro-rata from all stockholders, including the defendants."' To the defendants' argument that
they should not have to bear the expense of the litigation against themselves, the court correctly pointed out that as stockholders, the defendants were interested in the fund, regardless of the fact that as individuals, they had breached their fiduciary obligations. Furthermore, by
the decree they had become entitled to a legal share of a fund which
?0 Hechelman v. Geyer, 252 Pa. 123, 97 A. 193 (1916); Provident Trust Co. v. Geyer,
248 Pa. 423, 94 A. 77 (1915).
80 In the sale of the shares of stock to Callery the intention of all the parties was

that the purchaser took the property and assets of the corporation and the
shareholders were to get $64 per share for all stock transferred under the agreement. Under these circumstances, it is too plain for argument that the stockholders of record when the sale was made are entitled to the full benefit accruing
either to them as individual shareholders, or resulting from the sale of treasury
stock in which they were interested to the extent of their respective holdings. It
is but fair to say that those who purchased the stock, and who now represent the
management and control of the corporation, make no claim to any part of this
profit.
Provident Trust Co. v. Geyer, 248 Pa. 423, 425, 94 A. 77, 79 (1915).
81 Hechelman v. Geyer, 252 Pa. 123, 97 A. 193 (1916).
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previously they had obtained illegally, and because of this benefit to
themselves as shareholders, they should share in the expense propor82
tionately.
A. Choosing the Form of the Action-The Kahan Decision
The Geyer decisions were considered unique until the very recent
case of Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 3 which reintroduced the role of the thirdparty purchaser into the larger problem of recovery of benefits and
attorneys' fees. This case called into play the basic distinctions which
exist between class actions and derivative suits, and emphasized -the
very real danger in not choosing the correct form of action.
The Kahan case was brought as a class action on behalf of all the
-common stockholders of Schenley Industries, Inc., except the defendants.
The complaint alleged that Glen Alden Corporation had purchased
945,126 Schenley common shares from Rosenstiel, Schenley's controlling shareholder, at $80 per share, but was offering all other shareholders,
by tender, a package of cash and securities worth only $60 per share at
a time when a better offer to all shareholders existed in the form of a
tender offer by P. Lorillard Company. While suit was pending, the
tender offer was twice amended, the final offer being raised to a package
admittedly worth $80, thus mooting the basic cause of action. The
plaintiff filed his petition for attorneys fees, alleging that through his
efforts, a fund of $83,000,000 had been created for the class he represented, i.e., 4,150,000 shares at $20 per share. In the interim the tender
offer was completed.
Rather than seeking to enjoin the $80 package payment by Glen
Alden to the Schenley shareholders, or to assert a lien on that fund for
his fees, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants, Glen Alden and its
controlling shareholder, Riklis, in paying out the disputed funds without observing the procedural requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, were guilty of such unconscionable con82 Of additional interest in these cases is the holding by the court that the purchaser
-of the shares, Callery, did not have the right to share in that portion of the fund
attributable to the shares then owned by him, and that the pro-rata distribution of
the fund recovered was not in the nature of a dividend, which would follow the legal
title to the stock, but was a purely equitable distribution to those shareholders of
record as of the date of the illegal transfer of the treasury stock. Id. at 125, 97 A.
at 195.
83 300 F. Supp. 447 (D. Del. 1969), rev'd 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 398
U.. 950 (1970).
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duct as to warrant the imposition of attorney's fees against them as
defendants.8 4
The court of appeals sustained the plaintiff's contention, holding that
he would be entitled to counsel fees from the defendants upon proof
of a causal connection between his suit and the substantial benefit finally
accorded to the class, and proof that the defendants' conduct in failing
to observe the requirements of Rule 23 prevented the creation of a fund
from which fees could be awarded." '
The importance of this case is two-fold. First, it demonstrates the
complexity of the legal issues presented by a third-party tender offer
engrafted onto the normal problems of corporate tort litigation; and
second, it raises the problem of the correct choice of remedies in such
situations. In the Kahan case, the substantial benefits allegedly caused
by plaintiff's action took the form of a markedly more generous tender
offer, which was then accepted, so that each shareholder was in immediate possession of his direct benefit. Short of seeking and receiving
an injunction establishing an attorney's lien on the amounts paid out to
-all shareholders under the tender, the plaintiff by his class action, because his suit was not brought on behalf of the corporation, was reduced
to seeking and proving relief against the defendants as active wrongdoers.
Under these circumstances, a derivative action would appear to have
offered the better alternative. The distinguishing factor between the
class action and the shareholder derivative suit is the class represented
by the plaintiff. Where the plaintiff seeks to protect an interest which
is peculiar to himself or his particular class of stock, the action is a class
action. However, when the plaintiff seeks to redress a breach of a fiduciary duty by management, the action is a derivative suit. In seeking
redress from management the plaintiff represents the entire corporation
by protecting all the shareholders from unwarranted conduct on the
part of management. If the benefits achieved for the corporation by the
action result in a direct payment to the shareholders, rather than to the
corporation, plaintiff's counsel nevertheless would be entitled to an
award of counsel fees under the Mills doctrine, and such an award could
be enforced by a lien upon the funds prior to distribution to the individual shareholders.
84

The plaintiff relied upon the rule utilized in Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc.,
187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), aff'd 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1963).
85 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970).
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B. The Applicability of the Mills Doctrine-An Illustrative Case:
The recovery of attorneys' fees under the Mills doctrine in the thirdparty purchaser situation can best be demonstrated by posing an illustrative case. Assume a derivative action is filed alleging that as a result
of a consent order brought by the Justice Department against B, the
majority stockholder, B had agreed to divest itself of its 60 per cent
ownership in the corporation A. Assume further that corporation A's
management then makes an offer to repurchase the same 60 per cent of
its own stock for $10,000,000 on terms and conditions which could
impair its capital, would entail grave financial risks to the corporation
and its remaining shareholders, and would involve the use of an untrue
and misleading proxy statement seeking shareholder approval of the
plan. After trial, and while the case is under submission, B notifies the
corporation A and the court that it is invoking an escape clause in its
contract as to pending litigation to terminate its contract. B thereupon
enters into a new contract with a third-party purchaser, corporation C,
under which B receives a total of $12,000,000 and the remaining shareholders of corporation A are given the opportunity to tender at the
same price per share. As a result of such tender, corporation C secures
complete ownership of corporation A.
During these negotiations, the court hands down a tentative decision
finding in the plaintiff's favor in the derivative action. While the merits
of the litigation have been mooted by the intervention of the third-party
purchaser, the court retains jurisdiction to pass upon plaintiff's application for legal fees, and imposes a lien of $2 per share on the tender
offer proceeds, pending such decision.
Ordinarily, when plaintiff's attorneys are awarded fees in a shareholder's derivative suit for the benefits produced by their services, the
corporation is required to pay the fees since it directly receives the
benefits, for the indirect benefit of all the shareholders. In that usual
situation, the shareholders for the most part remain shareholders. The
shareholder in those cases cannot insist on a direct pro-rata recovery,
because 1) generally he has no right to demand his part of the firm's
capital be withdrawn, 2) it could interfere with the payment of claims
of corporate creditors, and 3) it would involve a multiplicity of suits.8 6
However, the proposed hypothetical case produces the unique circumstance where the direct benefit to the corporation which the selliiig
s 6 Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39
784, 785-86 (1939).

COLuM.
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shareholders would have indirectly received had they remained shareholders is exchanged for a direct benefit to the selling shareholders in the
form of an increased purchase price for their stock, which in turn
means that most of the shareholders on whose behalf suit was brought
are no longer shareholders of the corporation, and have in fact secured
the withdrawal of their capital.
If under those circumstances the corporation were required to pay
the entire attorneys' fees, the shareholders who sold their stock to corporation C would be unjustly enriched and the purchaser would indirectly be paying most of the fees as the new majority shareholder of
the corporation. Although the purchaser must be presumed to have
expected when it made its offer that there would be attorneys' fees taxed
against the corporation, it does seem equitable that the selling shareholders, including B, should bear their fair share of the attorneys' fees."'
This assumed case is directly analogous to those cases in which the
corporation has been liquidated or otherwise become defunct prior to
the recovery of the fund through shareholder litigation. In such cases,
the courts have allowed the shareholders to recover directly for their
proportion of the corporate claim, without going through the fiction
of paying the fund into the corporation and then redistributing it to
the shareholders on a pro-rata basis.18
As stated in these cases, the fact that the fund realized through the
derivative litigation is being paid directly to the shareholders rather than
to the corporation does not change the basic action into one for the
benefit of individual shareholders; it is but a procedural recognition of
the fact that the corporate entity on whose behalf the suit was brought
is no longer in existence. As such, the same rule which permits the
award of attorneys fees to one who has created or preserved a fund for
the corporation should be applied where one has created and preserved
a fund which is being paid directly to the shareholders.
It is the role of equity to tailor its relief to unique situations, to resist
inappropriate remedies carried forward from inapposite earlier decisions, in order to remain a viable, effective system of justice. The United
States Supreme Court in Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank"9 made the
following observation:
8

7See Heckelman v. Geyer, 252 Pa. 123, 97 A. 193 (1916).

88 See, e.g., Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927); Sale v. Ambler,
335 Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 519 (1939); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 A. 320 (1937); Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 A. 77 (1910).
89 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
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But when such a fund is for all practicable purposes created for the
benefit of others, the formalities of the litigation-the absence of an,
avowed class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare
decisis rather than through a decree-hardly touch the power of equity
in doing justice as between a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation. As in much else that pertains to equitable jurisdiction, individualization in the exercise of a discretionary power will alone retain equity
as a living system and save it from sterility. In the actual exercise of
the power to award costs "as between solicitor and client" all sorts of
practical distinctions have been taken in distributing the costs of the
burden of the litigation.9 0
As stated in the Mill?' case, the basic concept is to spread the cost of
such an award among all shareholders. The most common method of
awarding attorneys' fees in derivative actions is to tax the cost against
the corporation, because this is the simplest, easiest and most equitable
method in all cases where the beneficiaries of the lawsuit remain as
shareholders of the corporation.
The only equitable result in the posited case is to fashion the same
type of individualization of relief, and to hold that the shareholders,
including B, should each pay their proportionate cost of receiving the
benefits accorded to them by the litigation in addition to that portion
of the fees that should equitably b'e paid by the corporation.
This does not result in such shareholders paying a corporate debt.
They are paying their own debt, as beneficiaries of a fund created by
the plaintiffs, in which each shareholder has accepted his share.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As Professor Hornstein foresaw, time has allowed a sufficient number of cases to be decided to form the basis for setting and applying
equitable standards in awarding a reasonable fee in those derivative and
class actions where a monetary benefit can be demonstrated. The most
common practice has been to set the fee at 20 per cent of the benefit,
except in those cases in which the benefit is so large, by the standards
of the particular court, that a declining series of percentages should be
substituted.
00 Id. at 167.
91 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 US. 375, 394 (1970).
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In those cases where the benefit is difficult to calculate in monetary
terms, the courts have not generally spelled out with any great detail
their reasons behind a particular award. This is most noticeable in those
cases which have been mooted by unilteral action taken by the defendants, where the issue of cause and effect as between the litigation
and the eventual benefit is contested, as well as the amount of the benefit and the fee to be awarded.
In such instances, if it is impossible to fix a monetary value to the
benefit, the courts have not consistently discussed the relative weight
to be given to the remaining factors commonly examined in such applications. The time spent or the skill displayed, while relevant and easy
to apply, cannot be the sole factors left to be weighed because such a
limitation overlooks the all-important factor of the contingent nature
of the representation, and the risks attendant thereto. Because of the
stimulus to corporate democracy and prevention of illegality achieved
by derivative actions, 'even in the absence of a calculable monetary
benefit, attorneys should continue to be encouraged to undertake such
actions for their clients. This means that fee awards in these cases must
be generous.
In the absence of an ability to assign a monetary value to the benefit
achieved by the action, the court should scrutinize most carefully the
relationship between the result and the total monetary values affected
by such litigation. In every case it is possible to assign a monetary value
to the underlying transaction affected by the litigation, 9z and,in conjunction with the factors of time, skill, complexity of issues and the risk
involved in the representation, arrive at an award which is fair and reasonable. If done with a flavor of generosity without being ludicrous,
constant standards will develop in time.
The most convenient tool to aid the court in such an examination is
the percentage formula. A graduated scale, starting at 10 per cent on
the first $1,000,000 and then declining for each additional million dollars
involved in the litigation, would provide a workable solution to this
problem. The hope is that a sufficient number of judges will enunciate
their reasons for the awards made in non-monetary benefit cases so that
in time a reliable standard will 'emerge.
92

In Denney v. Phillips & Buttorff Corp., 331 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964), the disputed
transaction involved $2,700,000. The court used this as the measure of the case, awarding
plaintiff's counsel $235,000, or 8.7 per cent thereof.
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APPENDIX
REPORTED CASES

Case
1. Ripley v. Int'l Ry.,

16 App. Div.2d 260, 227 N.Y.S.2d
64 (1962)

Benefit
$8,000,000+
$7,500.000
Future
Benefits
3,300,000+

2. Zenn v. Anzalone,
Intangible
46 Misc. 2d 378, 259 N.Y.S.2d
Benefits
747 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
7,920,681
General,
Inc.,
3. Newmark v. RKO
332 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
1,150,000
4. Perlman v. Feldrnann,
160 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1958)
6,429,299
5. The Herald Co. v. Bonfils,
315 F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1970)
6. Epstein v. Weiss,
1,000,000
1971 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92938 (ED. La. 1970)
7. Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253
1,825,000
F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
8. Green v. Transitron Electronic
5,300,000
Corp., 326 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.
1964)
2,700,000
9. Maggiore v. Bradford,
310 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1962)
10. Newman v. Electronic Specialty
1,200,000
Co., 1971 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
2955 (N.D. Ill. 1971)
11. National Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. 1,025,000
Rosson, 400 S.W.2d 366
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
1,200,000
12. Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp.,
254 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
13. Stull v. Kaymarq Consol. Corp.,
440,000
1970 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
:T 92508 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
14. Berger v. Amana Soc'y, 257
5,000,000
Iowa 956, 135 N.W.2d 618 (1965)
15. Krinsky v. Helfand, 38 Del.
500,000
Ch. 553, 156 A.2d 90 (1959)

Fee
$2,104,900

Percentage
20%+
$104,900

1,876,000

20

750,000

9.4

450,000
300,000

39
4+

300,000

30

285,000

16

266,500

5

235,000

8.7

240,000

20

200,000

19

152,500

12 ,4

142,000

32

125,000
100,000

2i4
20

[Vol. 6:259

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
REPORTED CASES

Case

f6. Pergament v. Kaiser-Frazer'Corp.,
224 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1955)
17.- Angoff v. Goldfine,
270 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959)
18. Volvovitz v.- VTR, Inc.,
1971 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93292 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
19. Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, Inc.,
266 Cal. App. 2d, 72 Cal. Rptr.

146,(1968)
20. Katz v. E.L.I. Computex, Inc.,
21.

22.
23.
24.

1,971 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92994 (1971)
Mardel Sec., Inc. v.
Alexandria Gazette Corp., 278
F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Va. 1967)
Sarner v. Sarner, 38 N.J. 463,
185 A.2d 851 (1962)
Magida v. Continental Can Co.,
176 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
Alexander v. Lindsey, 152 So. 2d
261 (La. Ct. App. 1963)

Benefit

Fee

Percentagei

500,000

100,000

662,500

88,000 (Descending
percentage
25% down)

20

400,000

75,000

18 X

200,000

64,784

32

200,000

30,000

15

125,000

25,000

20

483,738

25,000

5

47,000

12,000

25

8,667

1,733

20

UNREPORTED CASES

Case
1. Martin v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
Civil No. 7245 (S.D. Ohio 1970)
2. Manacher v. Reynolds, Del. Ch.
Civil No. 1129 (May 26, 1961)
3. Fisher v. Kletz, N.Y.L.J.
(S.D.N.Y., Dec. 9, 1971)
4. Cole v. Union Bankers Life
Ins. Co., Civil No. 9286
(N.D. Texas 1970)
5. Zeitlin v. Bergen, Civil No. 664479 (S.D.N.Y., July 23, 1971)

Benefit

Fee

Percentage

$6,300,000

$ 630,000

10%

1,728,900

500,000

29

1,010,000

209,846

20z

600,000

200,000

33Y3

800,000

190,000

23%

19721

COUNTSEL FEES

UNREPORTED CASES

Case
6. Loewi v. Fairchild-Hiller Corp.,
Civil No. 66-975 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)
7. Jamison v. Barr, Civil No. 692795 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 1971)
8. Schilkret v. Feeley (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. Co. 1957)
9. Getz v. Baker, Index No. 13445/
57 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966)
10. Spirt v. Bechtel, Civil No. 53-105
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 4, 1959)
11. Levitt v. Johnson, Civil No. 63389-w (D. Mass., Mar. 22, 1966)
12. Franklin v. Blaylock, Civil No. 624067 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 20, 1964)
13. Blau v. Mission Corp., Civil No.
64-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
14. Entel v. Guilden, Civil No.
63-788 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
15. Blay v. Kagan, Civil No. 66-4196
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)

Benefit

Fee

Percentage

600,000

180,000

30

600,000

175,000

29

300,000

113,750

37V2

400,000

100,000

25

202,600

75,000

37

250,000

62,500

25

150,000

50,000

33%

70,400

35,000

49

120,000

32,000

26M

28,001

10,000

35.7

